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2. International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 
.Judgment, 4-12 November 1948 (Excerpts) 
NoTE . The trial of those accused in Indictment No. 1 on 3 May 1946 
Pleas of "not guilty" were entered for all the defendants. Evidence was heard 
between 3 June 1946 and 10 February 1948; 419 witnesses testified in court, and 
4, 336 exhibits and depositions and affidavits of 779 witnesses were admitted 
in evidence. Defendants Matsuoka and Nagano died during the course of the 
trial, and the indictment of the defendant Okawa was suspended by reason of 
his insanity. The judgment of the Tribunal was read by the President of the 
Tribunal, Sir William Webb, from 4 to 12 November 1948. The Indian Mem-
ber of the Tribunal dissented, the French and Netherlands Members dissented 
in part, the Philippine Member wrote a separate concurring opinion, and the 
President filed a separate statement of reasons. The Tribunal's judgment was 
published at Tokyo in six fascicules with a total of 1,218 pages, and an annex 
of 130 pages. 
PART A 
CHAPTER 1. EsTABLISHMENT AND PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE TRIBUNAL 
[The Tribunal summarized the instruments under which it was established 
an:d the course of its proceedings.] 
CHAPTER II. THE LAW 
(a) jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
In our opinion the law of the Charter is decisive 
and binding on the Tribunal. This is a special tri-
bunal set up by the Supreme Commander under 
authority conferred on him by the Allied Powers. 
It derives its jurisdiction from the Charter. In this 
trial its members have no jurisdiction except such as 
is to be found in the Charter. The Order of the Su-
preme Commander, which appointed the members 
of the Tribunal, states: "The responsibilities, powers, 
and duties of the members of the Tribunal are set 
forth in the Charter thereof ... " In the result, the 
members of the Tribunal, being otherwise wholly 
without power in respect to the trial of the accused, 
have been empowered by the documents, which con-
stituted the Tribunal and appointed tnem as 
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members, to try the accused but subject always to 
the duty and responsibility of applying to the trial 
the law set forth in the Charter 0 
The foregoing expression of opinion is not to be 
taken as supporting the view, if such view be held, 
that the Allied Powers or any victor nations have the 
right under international law in providing for the 
trial and punishment of war criminals to enact or 
promulgate laws or vest in their tribunals powers in 
conflicts with recognised international law or rules or 
principles thereof 0 In the exercise of their right to 
create tribunals for such a purpose and in conferring 
powers upon such tribunals belligerent powers may 
act only within the limits of international lavv 0 
The substantial grounds of the defence challenge 
to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear and adjudi-
cate upon the charges contained in the Indictment 
are the following: 
(1) The Allied Powers acting through the Supreme 
"~ommander have no authority to include in the 
!Charter of the Tribunal and to designate as justici-
able "Crimes against Peace" (Article 5 (a)); 
(2) Aggressive war is not per se illegal and the Pact 
of Paris of 1928 renouncing war as an instrument of 
national policy does not enlarge the meaning of war 
crimes nor constitute war a crime; 
(3) War is the act of a nation for which there is 
no individual responsibility under international law; 
( 4) The provisions of the Charter are "ex post 
fas=to" legislation and therefore illegal; 
(5) The Instrument of Surrender which provides 
that the Declaration of Potsdam will be given effect 
imposes the condition that Conventional War Crimes 
as recognised by international law at the date of the 
Declaration (26 July, 1945) would be the only crimes 
prosecuted; 
( 6) Killings in the course of belligerent operations 
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except in so far as they constitute violations of the 
rules of warfare or the laws and customs of war are 
the normal incidents of war and are not murder; 
(7) Several of the accused being prisoners of war 
are triable by court martial as provided by the 
Geneva Convention 1929 and not by this Tribunal. 
Since the law of the Charter is decisive and binding 
upon it this Tribunal is formally bound to reject 
the first four of the above seven contentions advanced 
for the Defence but in view of the great importance 
of the questions of law involved the Tribunal will 
record its opinion on these questions. 
After this Tribunal had in May 1946 dismissed 
the defence motions and upheld the validity of its 
Charter and its jurisdiction thereunder, stating that 
the reasons for this decision would be given later, the 
International Military Tribunal sitting at Nurem-
berg delivered its verdicts on the first of October 
1946. That Tribunal expressed inter alia the follow-
Ing opinions: 
The Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power on the part 
of the victorious nations but is the expression of internationa1 
law existing at the time of its creation; 
The question is what ·was the legal effect of this pact (Pact of 
Paris August 27, 1928)? The Nations who signed the pact or 
adhered to it unconditionally condemned recourse to war for 
the future as an instrument of policy and expressly renounced it. 
After the signing of the pact any nation resorting to war as an 
instrument of national policy breaks the pact. In the opinion 
of the Tribunal, the solemn renunciation of war as an instru-
ment of national policy necessarily involves the proposition 
that such a war is illegal in international law; and that those who 
plan and wage such a war, with its inevitable and terrible con-
sequences, are committing a crime in so doing. 
The principle of international law which under certain circum-
stances protects the representative of a state cannot be applied 
to acts which are condemned as criminal by international law. 
The authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their 
official position in order to be freed from punishment in a p-
propriate proceedings. 
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The maxim "nullum crimen sine lege" is not a limitation of 
sovereignty but is in general a principle of justice. To assert 
that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties and 
assurances have attacked neighboring states without warning 
is obviously untrue for in such circumstances the attacker must 
know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to 
punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go 
unpunished. 
The Charter specifically provides ... "the fact that a de-
fendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a 
superior shall not free him from responsibility but may be 
considered in mitigation of punishment." This provision is in 
conformity with the laws of all nations . . . The true test which 
is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations 
is not the existence of the order but whether moral choice was 
in fact possible. 
With the foregoing opinions of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and the reasoning by which they are reached 
this Tribunal is in complete accord. They embody 
complete answers to the first four of the grounds 
urged by the defence as set forth above. In view of 
the fact that in all rna terial respects the Charters of 
this Tribunal and the Nuremberg Tribunal are iden-
tical, this Tribunal prefers to express its unqualified 
adherence to the relevant opinions of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal rather than by reasoning the matters anew 
in somewhat different language to open the door to 
controversy by way of conflicting interpretations of 
the two statements of opinions. 
The fifth ground of the Defence challenge to the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction is that under the Instrument 
of Surrender and the Declaration of Potsdam the 
otily crimes for which it was contemplated that pro-
ceedings would be taken, being the only war crimes 
recognized by international law at the date of the 
Declaration of Potsdam, are Conventional War 
Crimes as mentioned in Article 5 (b) of the Charter. 
Aggressive war was a crime at international law 
long prior to the date of the Declaration of Potsdam, 
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and there is no ground for the limited interpretation 
of the Charter which the defense seek to give it. 
A special argument was advanced that in any 
event the Japanese Government, when they agreed 
to accept the terms of the Instrument of Surrender, 
did not in fact understand that those Japanese who 
were alleged to be responsible for the war would be 
prosecuted. 
There is no basis in fact for this argument. It has 
been established to the satisfaction of the Tribunal 
that before the signature of the Instrument of Surren-
der the point in question had been considered by the 
Japanese Government and the then members of the 
Government, who advised the acceptance of the 
terms of the Instrument of Surrender, anticipated 
that those alleged to be responsible for the war would 
be put on trial. As early as the lOth of August, 
1945, three weeks before the signing of the Instru-
ment of Surrender, the Emperor said to the accused 
Kido, "I could not bear the sight ... of those re-
sponsible for the war being punished ... but I think 
now is the time to bear the unbearable." 
The sixth contention for the Defence; namely, that 
relating to the charges which allege the commission 
of murder will be discussed at a later point. 
The seventh of these contentions is made on behalf 
of the four accused who surrendered as prisoners of 
war-Itagaki, Kimura, Muto and Sato. The sub-
mission made on their behalf is that they, being 
former members of the armed forces of Japan and 
prisoners of war, are triable as such by court martial 
under the articles of the Geneva Convention of 1929 
relating to prisoners of war, particularly Articles 60 
and 63, and not by a tribunal constituted otherwise 
than under that Convention. This very point was 
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States of 
America in the Yamashita case. The late Chief 
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Justice Stone, delivering the judgment for the ma-
jority of the Court said: "We think it clear from the 
context of these recited provisions that Part 3 and 
Article 63, which it contains, apply only to judicjal 
proceedings directed against a prisoner of war for 
offences committed while a prisoner of war. Section 
V gives no indication that this part was design a ted to 
deal with offences other than those referred to in 
Parts 1 and 2 of Chapter 3 ." With that conclusion 
and the reasoning by which it is reached the Tribunal 
respectfully agrees. 
The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
wholly fails. 
(b) Responsibilz.ty for War Crimes 
Against Prisoners 
Prisoners taken in war and civilian internees are 
in the power of the Government which captures them. 
This was not always the case. For the last two cen-
turies, however, this position has been recognised 
and the customary law to this effect was formally 
embodied in the Hague Convention No. IV in 1907 
and repeated in the Geneva Prisoner of War Conven-
tion of 1929. Responsibility for the care of prisoners 
of war and of civilian internees (all of whom we will 
refer to as "prisoners") rests therefore with the Gov-
ernment having them in possession. This responsi-
bility is not limited to the duty of mere maintenance 
but extends to the prevention of mistreatment. In 
particular, acts of inhumanity to prisoners which are 
forbidden by the customary law of nations as well as 
by conventions are to be prevented by the Govern-
ment having responsibility for the prisoners. 
In the discharge of these duties to prisoners Gov-
ernments must have resort to persons. Indeed the 
Governments responsible, in this sense, are those 
persons who direct and control the functions of 
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Government. In this case and in the above regard 
we are concerned with the members of the Japanese 
Cabinet. The duty to prisoners is not a meaningless 
obligation cast upon a political abstraction. It is a 
specific duty to be performed in the first case by those 
persons who constitute the Government. In the 
multitude of duties and tasks involved in modern 
government there is of necessity an elaborate system 
of subdivision and delegation of duties. In the case 
of the duty of Governments to prisoners held by them 
in time of war those persons who constitute the Gov-
ernment have the principal and continuing responsi-
bility for their prisoners, even though they delegate 
the duties of maintenance and protection to others. 
In general the responsibility for prisoners held by 
Japan may be stated to have rested upon: 
(1) Members of the Government; 
(2) Military or Naval Officers in command of 
formations having prisoners in their possession; 
(3) Officials in those departments which were 
concerned with the well-being of prisoners; 
( 4) Officials, whether civilian, military, or 
naval, having direct and immediate control of 
prisoners. 
It is the duty of all those on whom responsibility 
rests to secure proper treatment of prisoners and to 
prevent their ill-treatment by establishing and se-
curing the continuous and efficient working of a 
system appropriate for these purposes. Such per-
sons fail in this duty and become responsible for 
ill-treatment of prisoners if: 
(1) They fail to establish such a system. 
(2) If having established such a system, they 
fail to secure its continued and efficient working. 
Each of such persons has a duty to ascertain that 
the system is working and if he neglects to do so he 
is responsible. He does not discharge his duty by 
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merely instituting an appropriate system and there-
after neglecting to learn of its application. An Army 
Commander or a Minister of War, for example, must 
be at the same pains to ensure obedience to his orders 
in this respect as he would in respect of other orders 
he has issued on matters of the first importance. 
Nevertheless, such persons are not responsible if a 
proper system and its continuous efficient functioning 
be provided for and conventional war crimes be com-
mitted unless: 
(1) They had knowledge that such crimes were 
being committed, and having such knowledge 
they failed to take such steps as were within 
their power to prevent the commission of such 
crimes in the future, or 
(2) They are at fault in having failed to ac-
quire such knowledge. 
If, such a person had, or should, but for negligence 
or supineness, have had such knowledge he is not 
excused for inaction if his Office required or permitted 
him to take any action to prevent such crimes. On 
the other hand it is not enough for the exculpation of 
a person, otherwise responsible, for him to show that 
he accepted assurances from others more directly 
associated with the control of the prisoners if having 
regard to the position of those others, to the fre-
quency of reports of such crimes, or to any other 
circumstances he should have been put upon further 
enquiry as to whether those assurance~ were true or 
untrue. That crimes are notorious, numerous and 
widespread as to time and place are matters to be 
considered in imputing knowledge. 
A member of a Cabinet which collectively, as one 
of the principal organs of the Government, is re-
sponsible for the care of prisoners is not absolved 
from responsibility if, having knowledge of the 
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commiSSion of the crimes in the sense already dis-
cussed, and omitting or failing to secure the taking of 
measures to prevent the commission of such crimes in 
the future, he elects to continue as a member of the 
Cabinet. This is the position even though the De-
partment of which he has the charge is not directly 
concerned with the care of prisoners. A Cabinet 
member may resign. If he has knowledge of ill-
treatment of prisoners, is powerless to prevent future 
ill-treatment, but elects to remain in the Cabinet 
thereby continuing to participate in its collective 
responsibility for protection of prisoners he willingly 
assumes responsibility for any ill-treatment in the 
future. 
Army or Navy Commanders can, by order, secure 
proper treatment and prevent ill-treatment of prison-
ers. So can Ministers of War and of the Navy. If 
crimes are committed against prisoners under their 
control, of the likely occurrence of which they had, 
or should have had knowledge in advance, they are 
responsible for those crimes. If, for example, it be 
shown that within the units under his command con-
ventional war crimes have been committed of which 
he knew or should have known, a commander who 
takes no adequate steps to prevent the occurrence of 
such crimes in the fut.ure -vvill be responsible for such 
future crimes. 
Departmental Officials having knowledge of ill-
treatment of prisoners are not responsible by reason 
of their failure to resign; but if their functions in-
cluded the administration of the system of protection 
of prisoners and if they had or should have had 
knowledge of crimes and did nothing effective, to the 
extent of their powers, to prevent their occurrence in 
the future then they are responsible for such future 
crimes. 
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(c) The Indictment 
[The Tribunal gave its reasons for abstaining from 
consideration of certain counts in the indictment. 
Counts 6 to 17, which charged the planning and 
preparation of wars of aggression and wars in viola-
tion of in tern a tional law, treaties, agreements and 
assurances, were not considered because the Tribunal 
found it unnecessary in respect to those defendants 
who were found guilty of conspiracy (charged in 
Counts 1 to 5) to enter convictions also for planning 
and preparing. Counts 18 to 26, which charged the 
initiation of a war of aggression and a war in violation 
of international law, treaties, agreements and assur-
ances, were not considered because the offense of 
initiating such wars was included in the offense of 
-vvaging them, alleged in Counts 27 to 36. Counts 39 
to 43 and 44 to 52, which charged the unlawful kill-
ing and murdering of various persons by unlawfully 
ordering, causing and permitting the armed forces of 
Japan to make certain attacks, were not considered 
because these murders were part of the offenses of un-
lawfully wagin.g war alleged in Counts 27 to 36. 
·-
[The Tribunal held it had no jurisdiction under the Charter to consider Counts 
37, 38, 44 and 52, which charged conspiracy to murder and to commit crimes 
in breach of the laws of war. Article 5 (a) of the Charter gave jurisdiction over 
conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, but Article 5 (b) and (c) were held 
not to give jurisdiction of conspiracies to commit conventional war crimes and 
crimes against humanity; a reference in Article 5 (c) to "a common plan or con-
spiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes" was held to refer exclusively to 
conspiracies to commit crimes against peace.] 
CHAPTER III. OBLIGATIONs AssuMED 
AND RIGHTS AcQUIRED BY jAPAN 
[The Tribunal made a detailed study of the international rights and obligations 
of Japan relevant to the indictment. It stated that these obligations form a 
background against which the actions of the accused as should be viewed and 
judged; later in the opinion it held that wars of aggression having been proved, 
it was unnecessary to consider whether they were also wars otherwise in violation 
of international law or in violation of treaties, agreements and assurances.] 
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PAR1~ B 
CHAPTER IV. THE MILITARY DoMINATION 
OF jAPAN AND PREPARATION FOR WAR 
[The Tribunal reviewed at length the internal political history of Japan between 
1 January 1928 and the conclusion of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Italy 
on 27 September 1940. The coming to power of military extremists in Japan 
was linked with external aggression in Manchuria and China.] 
CHAPTER v. jAPANESE AGGRESSION 
AGAINST CHINA 
[The history of Japanese military and economic penetration in Manchuria 
and North China after 18 September 1931, and of the setting up and operation 
of puppet governments in those areas, was reviewed.] 
CHAPTER VI. jAPANESE AGGRESSION 
AGAINST THE U.S.S.R. 
[The history of Japan's expectation, advocacy, planning and preparation of 
war against the U. S. S. R., of Japanese subversion and sabotage, and of the 
incidents at Lake Khassan in July 1938 and at Nomonhan in May 1939 was 
reviewed.] 
CHAPTER VII. THE pACIFIC wAR 
[The history of the planning and preparation of the Pacific War between the 
end of 1938 and 7 December 1941 and of its initiation on the latter date is set 
out at length. The end of the chapter is reproduced.] 
The Japanese Note Delivered in Washington 
On December 7th 1941 
Hague Convention No. III 1907, relative to the 
opening of hostilities, provides by its first Article 
"The Contracting Powers recognise that hostilities 
between themselves must not commence without pre-
vious and explicit warning in the form either of a 
reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with 
conditional declaration of war". That Convention 
was binding on Japan at all relevant times. Under 
the Charter of the Tribunal the planning, prepara-
tion, initiation, or waging of a war in violation of 
international law, treaties, agreements or assurances 
is declared to be a crime. Many of the charges in 
the indictment are based wholly or partly upon the 
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view that the attacks against Britain and the United 
States were delivered without previous and explicit 
warning in the form either of a reasoned declaration 
of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declara-
tion of war. For reasons which are discussed else-
where we have decided that it is unnecessary to deal 
with these charges. In the case of counts of the in-
dictment which charge conspiracy to wage aggressive 
wars and wars in violation of international law, 
treaties, agreements or assurances we have come to 
the conclusion that the charge of conspiracy to wage 
aggressive wars has been made out, that these acts 
are already criminal in the highest degree, and that 
it is unnecessary to consider whether the charge has 
also been established in respect of the list of treaties, 
agreements and assurances-including Hague Con-
vention III-which the indictment alleges to have 
been broken. We have come to a similar conclusion 
in respect to the counts which allege the waging of 
wars of aggression and wars in violation of inter-
national law, treaties, agreements and assurances. 
With regard to the counts of the indictment which 
charge murder in respect that wars were waged in 
violation of Hague Convention No. III of 1907 or of 
other treaties, we have decided that the wars in the 
course of which these killings occurred were all wars 
of aggression. The waging of such wars is the major 
crime, since it involves untold killings, suffering and 
misery. No good purpose would be served by con-
victing any defendant of that major crime and also of 
"murder" eo nomine. Accordingly it is unnecessary 
for us to express a concluded opinion upon the exact 
extent of the obligation imposed by Hague Conven-
tion III of 1907. It undoubtedly imposes the obliga-
tion of giving previous and explicit warning before 
hostilities are commenced, but it does not define the 
period which must be allowed between the giving of 
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this warning and the commencement of hostilities . 
The position was before the framers of the Conven-
tion and has been the subject of controversy among 
international lawyers ever since the Convention was 
made. This matter of the duration of the period 
between warning and hostilities is of course vital. If 
that period is not sufficient to allow of the transmis-
sion of the warning to armed forces in outlying ter-
ritories and to permit them to put themselves in a 
state of defence they may be shot down without a 
chance to defend themselves. It was the existence 
of this controversy as to the exact extent of the 
obligation imposed by the Convention which opened 
the way for TOGO to advise the Liaison Conference of 
30th November 1941 that various opinions were held 
as to the period of warning which was obligatory, 
that some thought it should be an hour and a half, 
some an hour, some half an hour. The conference 
left it to TOGO and the two Chiefs of Staff to fix the 
time of the delivery of the Note to Washington with 
the injunction that that time must not interfere with 
the success of the surprise attack. In short they 
decided to give notice that negotiations were broken 
off at so short an interval before they commenced 
hostilities as to ensure that the armed forces of Britain 
and the United States at the points of attack could 
not be warned that negotiations were broken off. 
TOGO and the naval and military men, to whom the 
task had been delivered, arranged that the Note 
should be delivered in Washington at 1.00 p.m. on 
7th December 1941. The first attack on Pearl 
Harbor was delivered at 1.20 p.m. Had all gone 
well, they would have allowed twenty minutes for 
Washington to warn the armed forces at Pearl Har-
bor. But so anxious were they to ensure that the 
attack would be a surprise that they allowed 
no margin for contingencies. Thus, through the 
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decoding and transcription of the Note in the Japanese 
Embassy taking longer than had been estimated, the 
Japanese Ambassadors did not in fact arrive with the 
Note at Secretary Hull's office in Washington until 
45 minutes after the attack had been delivered. As 
for the attack on Britain at Kota Bharu, it was never 
related to the time (1.00 p.m.) fixed for the delivery 
of the Note at Washington. This fact has not been 
adequately explained in the evidence. The attack 
was delivered at 11.40 a.m. Washington time, one 
hour and twenty minutes before the Note should 
have been delivered if the Japanese Embassy at 
Washington had been able to carry out the instruc-
tions it had received from Tokyo. 
We have thought it right to pronounce the above 
findings in fact for these rna tters have been the sub-
ject of much evidence and argument but mainly in 
order to draw pointed attention to the defects of the 
Convention as framed. It permits of a narrow con-
struction and tempts the unprincipled to try to com-
ply with the obligation thus narrowly construed 
while at the same time ensuring that their attacks 
shall come as a surprise. With the margin thus 
reduced for the purpose of surprise no allowance can 
be made for error, mishap or negligence leading to 
delay in the delivery of the warning, and the possi-
bility is high that the prior warning which the Con-
vention makes obligatory will not in fact be given. 
TOJO stated that the Japanese Cabinet had this in 
view for they envisaged that the more the margin 
was reduced the greater the possibility of mishap. 
The Formal Declaration of War 
The Japanese Privy Council's Committee of 
Investigation did not begin the consideration of the 
question of making a formal declaration of war upon 
the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands 
855422-50-7 
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until 7 .30 a .m ., 8th December (Tokyo time) -vvhen 
it met in the Imperial Palace for that purpose at 
that time. SHIMADA announced that the attacks 
had been made upon Pearl Harbor and Kota Bharu; 
and a bill declaring war on the United States and 
Great Britain, which had been drafted at the resi-
dence of HOSHINO during the night, was intro-
duced. In answer to a question during the delibera-
tions on the bill, TO JO declared in referring to the 
peace negotiations at Washington that, "those 
negotiations were continued only for the sake of 
strategy". TOJO also declared during the delibera-
tions that war would not be declared on the Nether-
lands in view of future strategic convenience; and 
that a declaration of war against Thailand would 
not be made as negotiations were in progress between 
Japan and Thailand for the conclusion of "an Alliance 
Pact". The Bill was approved; and it was decided 
to submit it to the Privy Council. The Privy Council 
met at 10.50 a.m., 8th December 1941 and passed the 
Bill. The Imperial Rescript declaring war against the 
United States and Great Britain was issued between 
11.40 and 12.00 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Washing-
ton time, 10.40 p.m. and 11.00 p.m., 7th December) 
(London time, 2.40 a.m. and 3.00 a.m., 8th Decem-
ber). Having been attacked, the United States of 
America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland declared war on Japan on 
9th December 1941 (London and Washington, 8th 
December). On the same day the Netherlands, 
Netherlands East Indies, Australia, New Zealand, 
South Africa, Free France, Canada and China also 
declared war on Japan. The next day, MillO 
stated in a conversation with the Chief of Operations 
of the Army General Staff that the sending of Am-
bassador Kurusu to the United States was nothing 
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more than a sort of camouflage of events leading to 
the opening of hostilities. 
Conclusions 
It remains to consider the contention advanced on 
behalf of the defendants that Japan's acts of aggres-
sion against France, her attack against the Nether-
lands, and her attacks on Great Britain and the 
United States of America were justifiable measures 
of self-defence. It is argued that these Powers took 
such measures to restrict the economy of Japan that 
she had no way of preserving the welfare and pros-
perity of her nationals but to go to war. 
The measures which were taken by these Powers 
to restrict Japanese trade were taken in an entirely 
justifiable attempt to induce Japan to depart from a 
course of aggression on which she had long been 
embarked and upon which she had determined to 
continue. Thus the United States of America gave 
notice to terminate the Treaty of Commerce and 
Navigation with Japan on 26th July 1939 after Japan 
had seized Manchuria and a large part of the rest of 
China and when the existence of the treaty had long 
ceased to induce Japan to respect the rights and 
interests of the nationals of the United States in 
China. It was given in order that some other means 
might be tried to induce Japan to respect these rights. 
Thereafter the successive embargoes which were im-
posed on the export of rna terials to Japan were 
imposed as it became clearer and clearer that Japan 
had ~determined . to attack the territories and interests 
of the Powers. They were imposed in an attempt to 
induce Japan to depart from the aggressive policy 
on which she had determined and in order that the 
Powers might no longer supply Japan with the 
materials to wage war upon them. In some cases, 
as for example . in the case of the embargo on the 
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export of oil from the United States of America to 
Japan, these measures were also taken in order to 
build up the supplies which were needed by the 
nations who were resisting the aggressors. The 
argument is indeed merely a repetition of Japanese 
propaganda issued at the time she was preparing for 
her wars of aggression. It is not easy to have pa-
tience with its lengthy repetition at this date when 
documents are at length available which demonstrate 
that Japan's decision to expand to the North, to the 
West and to the South at the expense of her neighbors 
was taken long before any economic measures were 
directed against her and was never departed from. 
The evidence clearly establishes contrary to the 
contention of the defense that the acts of aggression 
against France, and the attacks on Britain, the 
United States of America and the Netherlands were 
prompted by the desire to deprive China of any aid 
in the struggle she was waging against Japan's aggres-
sion and to secure for Japan the possessions of her 
neighbors in the South. 
The Tribunal is of opinion that the leaders of 
Japan in the years 1940 and 1941 planned to wage 
wars of aggression against France in French Indo-
China. They had determined to demand that 
France cede to Japan the right to station troops and 
the right to air bases and naval bases in French 
Indo-China, and they had prepared to use force 
against France if their demands were not granted. 
They did make such demands upon France u ~der 
threat that they would use force to · obtain them, if 
that should prove necessary. In her then situation 
France was compelled to yield to the threat of force 
and granted the demands. 
The Tribunal also finds that a war of aggression 
was waged against the Republic of France. The 
occupation by Japanese troops of portions of French 
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Indo-China, which Japan had forced France to 
accept, did not remain peaceful. As the war situa-
tion, particularly in the Philippines, turned against 
Japan the Japanese Supreme War Council in February 
1945 decided to submit the following demands to the 
Governor of French Indo-China: (1) that all French 
troops and armed police be placed under Japanese 
command, and (2) that all means of communication 
and transportation necessary for military action be 
placed under Japanese control. These demands 
were presented to the Governor of French Indo-China 
on 9th March 1945 in the form of an ultimatum 
backed by the threat of military action. He was 
given two hours to refuse or accept. He refused, and 
the ·Japanese proceeded to enforce their demands by 
military action. French troops and military police 
resisted the attempt to disarm them. There was 
fighting in Hanoi, Saigon, Phnom-Penh, Nhatrang, 
and towards the Northern Frontier. We quote the 
official Japanese account, "In the Northern frontiers 
the Japanese had considerable losses. The Japanese 
army proceeded to suppress French detachments in 
remote places and contingents which had fled to the 
mountains. In a month public order was re-
established except in remote places". The Japanese 
Supreme War Council had decided that, if Japan's 
demands were refused and military action was taken 
to enforce them, "the two countries will not be con-
sidered as at war". This Tribunal finds that 
Japanese actions at that time constituted the waging 
of a war of aggression against the Republic of France. 
The Tribunal is further of opinion that the attacks 
which Japan launched on 7th December 1941 against 
Britain, the United States of America and the Nether-
lands were wars of aggression. They were unpro-
voked attacks, prompted by the desire to seize the 
possessions of these nations. Whatever may be the 
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difficulty of stating a comprehensive definition of "a 
war of aggression", attacks made with the above 
motive cannot but be characterised as wars of 
aggression. 
It was argued on behalf of the defendants that, 
in as much as the Netherlands took the initiative 
in declaring war on Japan, the war which followed 
cannot be described as a war of aggression by Japan. 
The facts are that Japan had long planned to secure 
for herself a dominant position in the economy of the 
Nether lands East Indies by negotiation or by force of 
arms if negotiation failed. By the middle of 1941 it 
was apparent that the Netherlands would not yield to 
the Japanese demands. The leaders of Japan then 
planned and completed all the preparations for in-
vading and seizing the Nether lands East Indies. 
The orders issued to the Japanese army for this in-
vasion have not been recovered, but the orders issued 
to the Japanese navy on 5th November 1941 have 
been adduced in evidence. This is the Combined 
Fleet Operations Order No. 1 already referred to. 
The expected enemies are stated to be the United 
States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. The 
order states that the day for the outbreak of w·ar will 
be given in an Imperial General Headquarters order, 
and that after 0000 hours on that day a state of war will 
exist and the Japanese forces will commence opera-
tions according to the plan. The order of Imperial 
General Headquarters was issued on lOth November 
and it fixed 8th December (Tokyo time), 7th De-
cember (Washington time) as the date on which a 
state of war would exist and operations would com-
mence according to the plan. In the very first stage 
of the operations so to be commenced it is stated that 
the Southern Area Force will annihilate enemy fleets 
in the Philippines, British Malaya and the Nether-
lands East Indies area. There is no evidence that 
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the above order was ever recalled or altered in respect 
to the above particulars. In these circumstances we 
find in fact that orders declaring the existence of a 
state of war and for the execution of a war of aggres-
sion by Japan against the Nether lands were in effect 
from the early morning of 7th December 1941. The 
fact that the Netherlands, being fully apprised of the 
imminence of the attack, in self defence declared war 
against Japan on 8th December and thus officially 
recognised the existence of a state of war which had 
been begun by Japan cannot change that war from a 
war of aggression on the part of Japan in to something 
other than that. In fact Japan did not declare war 
against the Netherlands until 11th January 1942 
when her troops landed in the Netherlands East 
Indies. The Imperial Conference of 1st December 
1941 decided that "Japan will open hostilities against 
the United States, Great Britain and the Nether-
lands." Despite this decision to open hostilities 
against the Netherlands, and despite the fact that 
orders for the execution of hostilities against the 
Netherlands were already in effect, TOJO announced 
to the Privy Council on 8th December (Tokyo time) 
when they passed the Bill making a formal declaration 
of war against the United States of America and 
Britain that war would not be declared on the Nether-
lands in view of future strategic convenience. The 
reason for this was not satisfactorily explained in 
evidence. The Tribunal is inclined to the view that 
it w~as dictated by the policy decided in October 1940 
for the purpose of giving as little time as possible for 
the Dutch to destroy oil wells. It has no bearing, 
however, on the fact that Japan launched a war of 
aggression against the Netherlands. 
The position of Thailand is special. The evidence 
bearing upon the entry of Japanese troops into 
Thailand is meagre to a fault. It is clear that there 
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was complicity between the Japanese leaders and the 
leaders of Thailand in the years 1939 and 1940 when 
Japan forced herself on France as mediator in the 
dispute as to the border between French Indo-China 
and Thailand. There is no evidence that the posi-
tion of complicity and confidence between Japan 
and Thailand, which was then achieved, was altered 
before December 1941. It is proved that the 
Japanese leaders planned to secure a peaceful passage 
for their troops through Thailand into Malaya by 
agreement with Thailand. They did not wish to 
approach Thailand for such an agreement until the 
moment when they were about to attack Malaya, 
lest the news of the imminence of that attack should 
leak out. The Japanese troops marched through the 
territory of Thailand unopposed on 7th December 
1941 (Washington time). The only evidence the 
prosecution has adduced as to the circumstances of 
that march is (1) a statement made to the Japanese 
Privy Council between 10 a.m. and 11.00 a.m. 
on 8th December 1941 (Tokyo time) that an agree-
ment for the passage of the troops was being nego-
tiated, (2) a Japanese broadcast announcement that 
they had commenced friendly advancement into 
Thailand on the afternoon of the 8th December 
(Tokyo time) (Washington time, 7th December), 
and that Thailand had facilitated the passage by 
concluding an agreement at 12.30 p.m., and (3) a 
conflicting statement, also introduced by the pros-
ecution, that Japanese troops landed at Singora and 
Patani in Thailand at 3.05 in the morning of 8th 
December (Tokyo time). On 21st December 1941 
Thailand concluded a treaty of alliance with Japan. 
No witness on behalf of Thailand has complained of 
Japan's actions as being acts of aggression. In these 
circumstances we are left without reasonable cer-
tainty that the Japanese advance into Thailand was 
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contrary to the wishes of the Government of Thailand 
and the charges that the defendants initiated and 
waged a war of aggression against the Kingdom of 
Thailand remain unproved. 
Count 31 charges that a war of aggression was 
waged against the British Commonwealth of Nations. 
The Imperial Rescript which was issued about 12 
noon on 8th December 1941 (Tokyo time) states 
"We hereby declare war on the United States of 
America and the British Empire." There is a great 
deal of lack of precision in the use of terms throughout 
the many plans which were formulated for an attack 
on British possessions. Thus such terms as 
"Britain", "Great Britain", and "England"~~ are 
used without discrimination and apparently used as 
meaning the same thing. In this case there is no 
doubt as to the entity which is designated by "the 
British Empire". The correct title of that entity 
is "the British Commonwealth of Nations". That 
by the use of the term "the British Empire" they 
intended the entity which is more correctly called 
"the British Commonwealth of Nations" is clear 
when we consider the terms of the Combined Fleet 
Operations Order No. 1 already· referred to. That 
order provides that a state of war will exist after 
0000 hours X-Day, which was 8th December 1941 
(Tokyo time), and that, the Japanese forces would 
then commence operations. It is provided that in 
the ~ very first phase of the operations the '~South 
Seas Force" will be ready for the enemy fleet in the 
Australia area. Later it was provided that "The 
following are areas expected to be occupied or de-
stroyed as quickly as operational conditions permit, 
a, Eastern New Guiena, New Britain". These 
were governed by the Commonwealth of Australia 
under mandate from the League of Nations. The 
areas to be destroyed or occupied are also stated to 
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include "Strategic points in the Australia area". 
Moreover, "important points in the Australian 
coast" were to be mined. Now the Commonwealth 
of Australia is not accurately described as being part 
of "Great Britain", which is the term used in the 
Combined Fleet Secret Operations Order No. 1, nor 
is it accurately described as being part of "the 
British Empire", which is the term used in the 
Imperial Rescript. It is properly designated as 
part of "the British Commonwealth of Nations". 
It is plain therefore that the entity against which 
hostilities were to be directed and against which 
the declaration of war was directed was "the British 
"Commonwealth of Nations", and Count 31 is well-
founded when it charges that a war of aggression was 
waged against the British Commonwealth of Nations. 
It is charged in Count 30 of the Indictment that 
a war of aggression was waged against the Common-
wealth of the Philippines. The Philippines during 
the period of the war were not a completely sovereign 
state. So far as in tern a tional relations were con-
cerned they were part of the United States of 
America. It is beyond doubt that a war of aggres-
sion was waged against the people of the Philippines. 
For the sake of technical accuracy we shall consider 
the aggression against the people of the Philippines 
as being a part of the war of aggression waged against 
the United States of America. 
CHAPTER VIII. . CoNVENTIONAL WAR CRIMES 
(ATROCITIES) 
After carefully examining and considering all the 
evidence we find that it is not practicable in a 
judgment such as this to state fully the mass of oral 
and documentary evidence presented; for a complete 
statement of the scale and character of the atrocities 
reference must be had to the record of the trial. 
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The evidence relating to atrocities and other 
Conventional War Crimes presented before the 
Tribunal establishes that from the opening of the 
war in China until the surrender of Japan in August 
1945 torture, murder, rape and other cruelties of the 
most inhumane and barbarous character were freely 
practiced by the Japanese Army and Navy. During 
a period of several months the Tribunal heard evi-
dence, orally or by affidavit, from witnesses who 
testified in detail to atrocities committed in all 
theaters of war on a scale so vast, yet following so 
common a pattern in all theaters, that only one 
conclusion is possible-the atrocities were either 
secretly ordered or wilfully permitted by the J apa-
nese Government or individual members thereof and 
by the leaders of the armed forces. 
[There follows a detailed rev iew of Japanese atrocities and instances of mis-
treatment of prisoners of war proved before the Tribunal. The Japanese 
system for handling prisoners of war, Allied protests against mistreatment of 
prisoners, and Japanese condonation and concealment of ill-treatment of 
prisoners of war and civilian internees are reviewed.] 
PART C 
CHAPTER IX. FINDINGs oN CouNTs 
OF THE INDICTlVIENT 
In Count 1 of the Indictment it is charged that 
all the defendants together with other persons partic-
ipated in the formulation or execution of a common 
plan or conspiracy. The object of that common 
plan is alleged to have been that Japan should secure 
the military, naval, political and economic domina-
tion of East Asia and of the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans, and of all countries and islands therein or 
bordering thereon, and for that purpose should, 
alone or in combination with other countries having 
similar objects, wage a war or wars of aggress1on 
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against any country or countries which might oppose 
that purpose. 
There are undoubtedly declarations by some of 
those who are alleged to have participated in the 
conspiracy which coincide with the above grandiose 
statement, but in our opinion it has not been proved 
that these were ever more than declarations of the 
aspirations of individuals. Thus, for example, we 
do not think the conspirators ever seriously resolved 
to attempt to secure the domination of North and 
South America. So far as the wishes of the conspir-
ators crystallised into a concrete common plan we 
are of opinion that the territory they had resolved 
that Japan should dominate was confined to East 
Asia, the vVestern and South Western Pacific Ocean 
and the Indian Ocean, and certain of the islands in 
these oceans. We shall accordingly treat Count 1 
as if the charge had been limited to the above object. 
We shall consider in the first place whether a con-
spiracy with the above object has been proved to 
have existed. 
Already prior to 1928 Okawa, one of the original 
defendents, who has been discharged from this trial 
on account of his present mental state, was publicly 
advocating that Japan should extend her territory 
on the Continent of Asia by the threat or, if neces-
sary, by use of military force. He also advocated 
that Japan should seek to dominate Eastern Siberia 
and the South Sea Islands. He predicted that the 
course he advocated must result in a war between 
the East and the West, in which Japan would be the 
champion of the East. He was encouraged and 
aided in his advocacy of this plan by the Japanese 
General Staff. The object of this plan as stated was 
substantially the object of the conspiracy, as we 
have defined it. In our review of the facts we have 
noticed many subsequent declarations of the con-
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spirators as to the object of the conspiracy . These 
do not vary in any material respect from this early 
declaration by Okawa. 
Already when Tanaka was premier, from 1927 to 
1929, a party of military men, with Okawa and other 
civilian supporters, was advocating this policy of 
Okawa's that Japan should expand by the use of 
force. The conspiracy was now in being. It re-
mained in being until Japan's defeat in 1945. The 
immediate question when Tanaka was premier was 
whether Japan should attempt to expand her influ-
ence on the continent-beginning with Manchuria-
by peaceful penetration, as Tanaka and the members 
of his Cabinet wished, or whether that expansion 
should be accomplished by the use of force if neces-
sary, as the conspirators advocated. It was essential 
that the conspirators should have the support and 
control of the nation. This was the beginning of 
the long struggle between the conspirators, who ad-
vocated the attainment of their object by force, and 
those politicians and latterly those bureaucrats, who 
advocated Japan's expansion by peaceful measures 
or at least by a more discreet choice of the occasions 
on which force should be employed. This struggle 
culminated in the conspirators obtaining control of 
the organs of government of Japan and preparing 
and regimenting the nation's mind and material 
resources for wars of aggression designed to achieve 
the object of the conspiracy. In overcoming the 
opposition the conspirators employed methods which 
were entirely unconstitutional and at times wholly 
ruthless. Propaganda and persuasion won many to 
their side, but military action abroad without 
Cabinet sanction or in defiance of Cabinet veto, 
assassination of opposing leaders, plots to overthrow 
by force of arms Cabinets which refused to cooperate 
with them, and even a military revolt which seized 
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the capital and attempted to overthrow the govern-
ment were part of the tactics whereby the conspira-
tors came ultimately to dominate the Japanese 
polity. 
As and when they felt strong enough to overcome 
opposition at home and latterly when they had 
finally overcome all such opposition the conspirators 
carried out in succession the attacks necessary to 
effect their ultimate object, that Japan should dom-
inate the Far East. In 1931 they launched a war 
of aggression against China and conquered Man-
churia and Jehol. By 1934 they had commenced to 
infiltrate in to North China, garrisoning the land 
and setting up puppet governments designed to 
serve their purposes. From 1937 onwards they 
continued their aggressive war against China on a 
vast scale, overrunning and occupying much of the 
country, setting up puppet governments on the above 
model, and exploiting China's economy and natural 
resources to feed the Japanese military and civilian 
needs. 
In the meantime they had long been planning and 
preparing a war of aggression which they proposed 
to launch against the U.S.S.R. The intention was 
to seize that country's Eastern territories when a 
favourable opportunity occurred. They had also 
long recognized that their exploitation of East Asia 
and their designs on the islands in the Western and 
South Western Pacific would bring them into conflict 
with the United States of America, Britain, France 
and the Netherlands who would defend their threat-
ened interests and territories. They planned and 
prepared for war against these countries also. 
The conspirators brought about Japan's alliance 
with Germany and Italy, whose policies were as 
aggressive as their own, and whose support they 
desired both in the diplomatic and military fields, 
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for their aggressive actions in China had drawn on 
Japan the condemnation of the League of Nations 
and left her friendless in the councils of the world. 
Their proposed attack on the U.S.S.R. was post-
poned from time to time for various reasons, among 
which were (1) Japan's preoccupation with the war 
in China, which was absorbing unexpectedly large 
military resources, and (2) Germany's pact of non-
aggression with the U.S.S.R. in 1939, which for the 
time freed the U.S.S.R. from threat of attack on 
her Western frontier, and might have allowed her to 
devote the bulk of her strength to the defence of her 
Eastern territories if Japan had attacked her. 
Then in the year 1940 came Germany's great 
military successes on the continent of Europe. For 
the time being Great Britain, France and the 
Netherlands were powerless to afford adequate pro-
tection to their interests and territories in the Far 
East. The military preparations of the United 
States were in the initial stages. It seemed to the 
conspirators that no such favourable opportunity 
could readily recur of realising that part of their 
objective which sought Japan's domination of South-
West Asia and the islands in the Western and South 
Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. After pro-
longed negotiations with the United States of 
America, in which they refused to disgorge any sub-
stantial part of the fruits they had seized as the 
result of their war of aggression against China, on 
7tli December 1941 the conspirators launched a war 
of aggression against the United States and the 
British Commonwealth. They had already issued 
orders declaring that a state of war existed between 
Japan and the Netherlands as from 00.00 hours on 
7th December 1941. They had previously secured 
a jumping-off place for their attacks on the Philip-
pines, Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies by 
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forcing their troops in to French Indo-China under 
threat of military action if this facility was refused 
to them. Recognising the existence of a state of 
war and faced by the imminent threat of invasion of 
her Far Eastern territories, which the conspirators 
had long planned and were now about to execute, 
the Netherlands in self-defence declared war on 
Japan. 
These far-reaching plans for waging wars of aggres-
sion, and the prolonged and intricate preparation for 
and waging of these wars of aggression were not the 
work of one man. They were the work of many 
leaders acting in pursuance of a common plan for 
the achievement of a common object. That common 
object, that they should secure Japan's domination 
by preparing and waging wars of aggression, was a 
criminal object. Indeed no more grave crimes can 
be conceived of than a conspiracy to wage a war of 
aggression or the waging of a war of aggression, for 
the conspiracy threatens the security of the peoples 
of the world, and the waging disrupts it. The 
probable result of such a conspiracy, and the in-
evitable result of its execution is that death and 
suffering will be inflicted on countless human beings. 
The Tribunal does not find it necessary to consider 
whether there was a conspiracy to wage wars in 
violation of the treaties, agreements and assurances 
specified in the particulars annexed to Count 1. 
The conspiracy to wage wars of aggression was al-
ready criminal in the highest degree. 
The Tribunal finds that the existence of the 
criminal conspiracy to wage wars of aggression as 
alleged in Count 1, with the limitation as to object 
already mentioned, has been proved. 
The question whether the defendants or any of 
them participated in that conspiracy will be con-
sidered when we deal with the individual cases. 
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The conspiracy existed for and its execution occu-
pied a period of many years . Not all of the con-
spirators were parties to it at the beginning, and 
some of those who were parties to it had ceased to 
be active in its execution before the end. All of 
those who at any time were parties to the criminal 
conspiracy or who at any time with guilty knowledge 
played a part in its execution are guilty of the charge 
contained in Count 1. 
In view of our finding on Count 1 it is unnecessary 
to deal with Counts 2 and 3, which charge the 
formulation or execution of conspiracies with objects 
more limited than that which we have found proved 
under Count 1, or with Count 4, which charges the 
same conspiracy as Count 1 but with more speci-
fication. 
Count 5 charges a conspiracy wider in extent and 
with even more grandiose objects than that charged 
in Count 1. We are of opinion that although some 
of the conspirators clearly desired the achievement 
of these grandiose objects nevertheless there is not 
sufficient evidence to justify a finding that the con-
spiracy charged in Count 5 has been proved. 
For the reasons given in an earlier part of this 
judgment we consider it unnecessary to make any 
pronouncement on Counts 6 to 26 and 37 to 53. 
There remain therefore only Counts 27 to 36 and 54 
and 55, in respect of which we now give our findings. 
Counts 27 to 36 charge the crime of waging wars 
of aggression and wars in violation of in tern a tional 
law, treaties, agreements and assurances against the 
countries named in those counts. 
In the statement of facts just concluded we have 
found that wars of aggression were waged against 
all those countries with the exception of the Com-
monwealth of the Philippines (Count 30) and the 
Kingdom of Thailand (Count 34). With reference 
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to the Philippines, as we have heretofore stated, 
that Commonwealth during the period of the war 
was not a completely sovereign State and so far as 
in tern a tional relations were concerned it was a part 
of the United States of America. We further stated 
that it is beyond doubt that a war of aggression was 
waged in the Philippines, but for the sake of techni-
cal accuracy we consider the aggressive war in the 
Philippines as being a part of the war of aggression 
waged against the United States of America. 
Count 28 charges the waging of a war of aggression 
against the Republic of China over a lesser period 
of time than that charged in Count 27. Since we 
hold that the fuller charge contained in Count 2 7 
has been proved we shall make no pronouncement 
on Count 28. 
Wars of aggression having been proved, it is un-
necessary to consider whether they were also wars 
otherwise in violation of in tern a tional law or in vio-
lation of treaties, agreements and assurances. The 
Tribunal finds therefore that it has been proved 
that wars of aggression were waged as alleged in 
Counts 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35 and 36. 
Count 54 charges ordering, authorising and per-
mitting the commission of Conventional War Crimes. 
Count 55 charges failure to take adequate steps to 
secure the observance and prevent breaches of 
conventions and laws of war in respect of prisoners 
of war and civilian internees. We find that there 
have been cases in which crimes under both these 
Counts have been proved. 
Consequent upon the foregoing findings, we pro-
pose to consider the charges against individual 
defendants in respect only of the following Counts: 
Numbers 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 54 and 55. 
